T h is r es ear ch ar gu es th at th e inter action b etween inter n ation al tr ad e an d female labor force participation has played a significant role in the timing of th e d em ogr ap h ic tr an s ition an d , th er ef or e, h as d eter m in ed d iffer en ces in economic performance across countries. The theory suggests that international trade has affected the evolution of economies asymmetrically and that initial differences in capital labor ratios across countries were the source of this asymmetry. The main concern of our study is to show how differences in per household capital stocks, via international specialization, affect household choice of fertility and female labor force participation and how these decisions, in turn, feed back and affect the accumulation of capital. Surprisingly, and unlike the existing literature on international trade our model predicts a nonmonotonic relation between the specialization pattern and the stock of capital of the trade partner.
Introduction
World trade has been increasing secularly during the last two centuries. The ratio of world trade to output rose from 10% in 1870 to 21% in 1913 [Estevadeoral, Frantz, and Taylor (2003) ]. Another significant feature that has accompanied the twentieth century was the increase in female labor force participation. The participation of married women in the labor market has been increasing, secularly, from around 2% in 1880 to over 70% in 2000 [Fernández (2007) ]. 1 The timing of the demographic transition differed significantly across regions. For today's developed countries it occurred toward the end of the 19 th century and in the beginning of the 20 th century, whereas today's developing countries experienced a decline in the rate of population growth only in the last decades of the 20 th century.
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This paper integrates these different phenomena into a Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) trade model that highlights the interaction among international trade, female labor force participation and fertility. The main concern of the study is to show how differences in capital labor ratios across economies, via different trade patterns, affect a household's tradeoff between fertility and female labor force participation and how these decisions, in turn, feed back on growth rates of per household capital stocks. In particular, per household capital stocks are driven by two endogenous variables population growth and gross capital accumulation. Surprisingly, and unlike the existing literature on international trade, our model predicts a non-monotonic relation between the specialization pattern and the stock of capital of the trade partner.
The model builds on three basic elements from trade and demographic theory. First, capital labor ratio across countries affects specialization pattern. Second, specialization pattern affects the gender wage gap and third, the gender wage gap affects parents' optimal choice of fertility which, in turn, determines the stock of per household capital for future generations. Thus, the interaction between international trade and female labor force participation is the source for the demographic transition and, therefore, plays a significant role in determining differences in economic performance across countries. Moreover, our theory suggests that international trade has affected the evolution of economies asymmetrically. Initial differences in capital labor ratios across countries and factor intensity across sectors determine specialization patterns 1 The numbers for mothers of preschool age children are 6% for the year 1940 and 60% for today [Fogli and Veldkamp (2007) ].
2 For a comprehensive discussion on the demographic transition see Galor (2005) .
which can further intensify asymmetries of capital labor ratios. 3 A novel feature of our model is that due to differences in factors substitution across sectors capital intensity switches as economies develop. This feature produces a non-monotonic relation between the specialization pattern and the stock of capital of the trade partner.
Thus, the impact of trade on the demand for women's labor plays a key role in the model. As a result of international specialization some countries will specialize in production of goods which is particularly suitable for female workers. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of the expansion of this "female sector" on female labor force participation is ambiguous. The reason is that, by general equilibrium forces, trade makes the importing sector contract and factors reallocate to the exporting sector. If capital is the main factor reallocated to the "female sector", female wages increase and female labor participation rises. If, however, primarily male workers enter the "female sector", this leads to a depression of wages and the exit female labor. The last mechanism will be called the "crowding out effect" hereafter. Which of both effects prevails is a determinant of the capital endowment of the country in question.
The first part of our story deals with international trade and specialization pattern.
The overwhelming part of trade literature celebrates the gains from international specialization, independently whether its source is Ricardian or H-O type of comparative advantage, or whether it stem form other motives as increasing returns.
Potential losses from trade are viewed as an exception that occurs under very specific conditions. Prominent examples of such conditions are those driving the infant industry argument, where trade benefits only the countries which specialize on sectors with fast, exogenous productivity growth, while hurting the others (see e.g. Young (1991) and Baldwin (1969) ). Heavy economic frictions of the labor market or other institutions have also the potential to channel benefits from trade to one country only (e.g. Davis (1998) and Levchenko (2007) ). By and large, however, all countries are commonly thought to gain from international trade not only due to static gains through efficient factor allocation but in addition via enhanced productivity growth through increased competition. The present paper's story builds on the H-O trade mechanism according to which countries export goods whose production is relatively intensive in their abundant factors of production and import the other goods. In our model each country in autarky produces two different goods that can be produced by physical capital, women's labor and men's labor. A key assumption is the existence of different degree of substitutability between these factors in production of the two goods. Consequently, as economies accumulate capital, labor moves from one sector to another, causing capital intensity to switch which, in turn, affects the specialization pattern.
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The second part of our story deals with the specialization pattern and women's wage. Following Galor and Weil (1996) we adopt a framework in which, first, female have relative advantages in raising children and second, capital complements female labor more than mens'. Consequently, an increase in capital intensity in the "female sector" decreases the wage gap and increases female labor force participation. To asses the effects of trade take, for example, a country with a low capital stock that imports goods from the "female sector". The export sector expands and men leave the "female sector", which can thus accommodate a higher number of female workers -female wages increase. Yet if the same country specializes on production in the "female sector", male workers reallocate to the "female sector" thus driving down female wages. In this case, somewhat paradoxically, specialization in "female sectors" does nothing but attracting men to these sectors, increasing the gender wage gap and, thus, delay the integration of women in the labor market.
The third part of our story deals with link between women's relative wages and fertility. 5 In such a framework the pure effect of an increase in household income holding the price of children constant is to raise the demand for children. If all childrearing is done by women, an increase in women's wage raise both household income and the price of children, and so have offsetting income and substitution effects on the demand for children. In our model, if both men's and women's income increase proportionately, then the substitution effect driven by the increase in the cost of rasing children precisely cancels out the income effect and leaves fertility unchanged, and thus, closing the genders wage gap is the cause for fertility decline.
6
It is important to note here that an increase in the capital intensity in the "female sector" raises the relative wages of women. This element is captured by assuming 4 In this respect our paper is close to Grossman and Maggi (2000) who argue that trade pattern reflects differences in the distribution of talent across countries. However, our model differs by the dynamic aspect of capital accumulation that changes intensity across sectors and thus gives new insights for the existence of different trade patterns.
5 The analysis of fertility in the context of relative wages dates beck to Becker (1960) , Mincer (1963 ) Becker (1985 and Becker (1991) , and for contributions in long-run dynamics of fertility see Galor and Weil (1999) , Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002) 6 For such a mechanism see Galor and Weil (1996) and Cavalcanti and Tavares (2004) and for examples of its application see Heckman and Walker (1990) , Butz and Ward (1979) and Schultz (1985) .
that the complementarity between women's labor and physical capital is higher than it is between men's labor and physical capital. According to Goldin (1990) the dramatic increase in the relative wages of women during the nineteenth century was industrialization. Thus, our explanation for the rise in the relative wages of women during the process of development is that women's productivity increases and, therefore, the rewards to women's labor input increase as well. Technically speaking, and for the sake of simplicity we follow Galor and Weil (1996) by assuming that while women and men have equal quantities of brains, men have more brawn and that the bigger is the stock of capital, the higher the relative returns to brains endowments.
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There is very little research on the links and interaction between demography and international trade. In a H-O model, Findlay (1995) shows that countries specializing in unskilled labor production will tend to see a decline in the incentive to invest in education. In the long run this negatively affects the accumulation of human capital in these countries. The developed economies on the other hand, start out with a higher skill level and therefore tend to specialize in high-skilled production.
This expands the demand for high-skilled labor and therefore provides an incentive to further accumulate human capital.
8 In a Ricardian model Galor and Mountford (2006) endogenize education choice as well as fertility choice and argue that the gains from trade were channeled towards population growth in non-industrial countries while in the industrial countries they were directed towards investment in education and growth in output per capita. 9 Thus, our theory fits into this literature that aims to reveal the asymmetric impact of trade on different countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two formalizes our argument. Neill (2003) shows that there is still a 10% differential in female and male wages in the U.S. in 2000 that remains unexplained by gender differences in schooling, actual experience and job characteristics. For empirical evidence as well as theoretical explanations for gender wage gap see Albanesi and Olivetti (2005) , Altonji and Blank (1999) and Goldin (1990) among others.
8 In an econometric analysis of data on about 90 countries during 1960-90 Wood and Ridao-Cano (1999) finds that greater openness tends to cause divergence of secondary and tertiary enrolment rates between more-educated and less-educated countries, and also between land-scarce and landabundant countries.
9 Their theory suggests that international trade enhanced the specialization of industrial economies in the production of skilled intensive goods. The rise in the demand for skilled labor induced an investment in the quality of the population, expediting the demographic transition, stimulating technological progress and further enhancing the comparative advantage of these industrial economies in the production of skilled intensive goods. Thus the pattern of trade enhances the initial paten of comparative advantages and disadvantages. For other contributions focusing on the dynamics of comparative advantage see Findlay and Keirzkowsky (1983) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) among others.
Section 3 presents some concluding remarks and proofs of the main claims appear in the appendix.
The Model
The economy is populated with a mass of L t households, each containing one husband and one wife. Individuals live for three periods: Childhood, adulthood and old age. At childhood, each individual consumes a fixed quantity of time from her parents. at adulthood, individuals raise children and supply labor to the market, earning a wage. For convenience, we assume that they do not consume in this period. At old age, individuals do not work, and they consume their savings. The capital stock in each period is equal to the aggregate savings in the previous period.
A key assumption in our model is the difference between male and female. This difference is not reflected at childhood or at old age. At adulthood, however, men and women differ in their labor endowments. Workers can supply both raw physical strength and mental input. We assume that while men and women have equal endowments of mental input, men have more physical strength than women. Note that despite that differences between men and women are a major issue, we do not model differences in preferences between men and women but rather we assume that each household which is composed of a husband and a wife has a utility function by which this household chooses a joint consumption. 
The intermediate goods are produced with three factors: capital K, physical labor L p , and mental labor L m . For each of the two sectors we adopt the specification from Galor and Weil (1996) for the constant returns to scale technologies by assuming
10 For an alternative approach, see Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) and Basu (2006) In the present paper we focus on the effect of trade on sectors with different demand for male and female labor; hence we introduce differences in gender labor intensity across sectors in a very simple way by setting α 1 = α ∈ (0, 1) and α 2 = 1. Thus, the technologies are
Labor Supply
Men and women are equally efficient in raising children. On the labor market, however, each women supplies a unit of mental labor L m while men supply a unit of mental labor L m plus a unit of physical labor L p . Thus, as long as physical labor has a positive price, men receive a higher labor wage than women and therefore the opportunity cost of raising children is higher for a man than for a women. Consequently, men only raise children when women are doing so full-time. Parameters are assumed to be such that men never raise children.
Finally, we assume that male workers cannot divide mental and physical labor and must allocate both units to one and the same sector. This means, in particular, that men employed in the X 2 -sector waste their mental labor.
Preferences
Each period t households derive utility from the number of their children n and old-age consumption c of a final good Y .
It is assumed here that the only input required to raise children is time and thus the opportunity cost of raising children is proportional to the market wage. Let w t , which is spent on consumption and raising children. Let z be the fraction of the time endowment of one parent that must be spent in order to raise one child. If the wife spends time raising children, then the marginal cost of 11 Note that since the basic unit is a household which consists a husband and a wife, n t is in fact the number of couples of children that a couple has. a child is zw F t . If the husband spends time raising children, then the marginal cost of a child is zw M t . The household's budget constraint is therefore
where s t is the household's savings. In the second period, the household consumes their savings
where r t+1 is the interest rate.
Optimality
Cost minimizing final good producers choose factor requirements according to factor prices. Under perfect competition, production cost equals the final good's price P t , which we normalize to one. Writing p i,t as the price of intermediate good X i in period t, this means
Household maximizing problem yields
For a relatively high gender wage gap (7) implies that women raise children full-time. As the gender gap decreases women may join the labor force and decrease fertility. In the limit when w In order to capture the dynamics of female labor force participation observed in the data we assume that γ < 1/2. Consequently, for high gender wage gap, women do not participate in the labor market. However, as this gap falls households find it optimal to decrease fertility and increase the participation of women in the labor market. Thus, (4) collapses to
and (7) collapses to
Factor Prices
Notice that both consumption goods X i are essential in final good production. This means that they are produced in positive quantities so that L m 1,t > 0 holds. Consequently, the first unit of capital in sector X 1 is infinitely productive and K 1,t > 0 in equilibrium. Thus, we can write with (2) the returns to capital in the two sectors as
Similarly, male wages are derived form (2) and reflect the marginal productivity of their respective labor contribution
It will prove useful to the analysis in terms of per household variables. Therefore we define in these variables
as total capital, sectorial capital, mental labor and sectorial physical labor per household, respectively. Finally, we define
as the ratio of capital to mental labor employed in the first sector. This ratio will play a central role in the following analysis.
The Integrated Economy
Production (1) of the final good Y implies that expenditure on intermediate goods is constant in prices p i,t . In this closed economy, where total output equals total production in each sector, the relative price therefore satisfies
The full equilibrium allocation is determined by looking at two regime separatelythe first in which women do not, and the second in which women do participate in the formal labor market.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the second sector is too small to accommodate all male labor in equilibrium. More specifically, we assume
to be satisfied in throughout the following analysis. A sufficient condition for male labor in the first sector to be always positive, the relative price (17) must fall short of the ratio of marginal rates of transformation at l 1,t = 0, i.e.
(
This condition is whenever (1 − α) > (1 − θ)/θ or (18) holds. Under this assumption, the ratio of male to female (shadow) wage can be computed by the marginal productivities in the first sector. The relevant ratio is
which determines female labor force participation 1 − zn t through (9):
Equilibrium -the first regime zn t = 1. Women do not participate in the formal labor market so that m t = l 1,t . This implies that that conditions m t > 0 and k 1,t > 0 hold.
Case 1. Consider now the situation where, in addition, k 2,t > 0 and l 2,t > 0 is satisfied. Under these conditions male wages and rental rate in both sectors equalize and with (10) - (13) we have
This system determines implicitly the ratio κ t and p 2,t /p 1,t as a function of the parameters α and a/b. The equilibrium allocation is then determined by equating relative prices to those that clear the goods market (17). Using the resource constraints l 1,t + l 2,t = 1 and k 1,t + k 2,t = k t , the resulting equilibrium condition can be written as
Since κ t is independent of k t the expression on the left and, in particular, the term
must be constant as well. Thus, we conclude that l 1,t is an increasing function of k t and consequently l 2,t = 1 − l 1,t is decreasing in k t . With l 1,t = m t this implies
With this information we can compute the upper and lower limits on k t for which k i,t > 0 and l 1,t > 0 hold. The upper limit k H is determined by taking the limit
The lower limit k L is determined by taking the limit k 2,t → 0 in (22)
where κ t is still defined by (20) and (21).
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Case 2. For k t ≤ k L there is no capital employed in the X 2 -sector (k 2,t = 0) and the equilibrium is defined by (17) and (21) (use k 1,t = k t and m t = l 1,t )
This condition defines κ t as an increasing function of k t .
Case 3. For k t ≥ k H there is no labor employed in the X 2 -sector (l 2,t = 0) and the equilibrium is defined by (17) and (20) ακ
This condition defines the ratio κ t as an increasing function of k t . The resource constraint determines k 2,t = k t − k 1,t and equation (20) fixes the equilibrium prices.
Thus, κ t is increasing in the per household capital stock k t no matter the level of k t . Figure 1 summarizes these findings. At low k t all capital in employed in the first sector and X 2 is produced using labor only. Relative prices p 2,t /p 1,t are too low to attract capital to the second sector and (20) does not hold while prices are determined by (21) and (23). With increasing capital, k t , output in the first sector increases and the price of the second good appreciates up to the point where (20) and (21) hold with equality (this happens at k t = k L ). From this level on capital is used in both sectors and the capital labor share in the first sector is fixed by marginal rates of transformation in the X i -sectors. If capital exceeds the level k H it becomes cheap to the extend that it is the only profitable factor to employ in the second sector and all labor in employed in the first one. These calculations have
Figure 1: Capital labor ratio in the first sector under zn t = 1.
been performed assuming that women do not participate in the formal labor market (zn t = 1). From relation (19) we know, however, that there is a critical level of k 1,t above which female are attracted to the formal labor market. Thus, if the capital stock k t exceeds a certain threshold women enter the formal labor force. At this point, the second regime starts.
Equilibrium -the second regime zn t < 1. Via equation (19) κ t determines female labor force participation and there are two possible cases. First women enter the formal labor market at a capital stock k t below the level k L (low γ), or, second, women enter the formal labor market at a capital stock k t above the level k H (high γ).
Case 1 where k 2,t = 0. This implies l 2,t > 0. Since men keep working in the first sector (condition (18)) we conclude that equation (21) holds. Further notice that the interior solution of (19) implies
Combining equation (17) with (21) and (25) and using the resource constraints l 1,t + l 2,t = 1 and m t = l 1,t + (1 − zn t ) leads to the equilibrium condition
The expression on the left is decreasing in zn t while the term on the right is increasing in zn t and in k t so that the solution zn t is unique and decreasing in k t . By equation (25) this implies that the ratio κ t is increasing in k t .
Relative prices are determined by (21) and continue to increase in the capital stock k t as long as l 1,t , l 2,t > 0 and k 2,t = 0 hold. As k t grows large, however, relative prices hit the level p 2,t /p 1,t = ακ α−1 t , i.e. (20) is satisfied. Above this level k 2,t = 0 ceases to hold and capital and male labor is used in both, X 1 and X 2 production.
Case 2 where l 1,t , l 2,t > 0 and k 1,t , k 2,t > 0. At these intermediate levels of the capital stock, the ratio κ t is determined by the system (20) and (21) (and actually takes the same value of intermediate ranges of capital under zn t = 1). As long as l 1,t , l 2,t > 0 and k 1,t , k 2,t > 0 hold, the ratio κ t is thus constant and so are relative prices p 2,t /p 1,t and female labor force participation. Hence, when the capital stock increases further, this induces a reallocation of male labor towards the first sector as under zn t = 1. When this reallocation is complete all male work in the first sector.
Case 3 where l 2,t = 0. In this case the equilibrium is determined by (17), (19), and (20) and the resource constraints m t = 2 − zn t and k 2,t = k t − k 1,t . The resulting equilibrium 1 − θ θ
The expression to the left is increasing in κ t and decreasing in k t , while the expression to the right of (27) is decreasing in κ t . Thus, this condition defines κ t as an increasing function of k t . With (25) this implies that zn t is a decreasing function of k t . Consequently, the relative prices (20) are decreasing in k t thus preserving the allocation of male labor.
Notice finally that κ t is unbounded if the capital stock grows infinitely large, i.e.
lim kt→∞ κ t = ∞. We turn to the second case where l 2,t = 0 holds at the threshold capital stock where women enter the formal labor market. The equilibrium is readily established. Since l 2,t = 0 implies k 2,t > 0 (20) holds. Together with (17) this implies again (27) and hence zn t and the ratio κ t are decreasing and increasing function of k t , respectively. These findings are summarized in Figure 2 . The left panel illustrates the case of small γ where female enter the labor force at the threshold k 2 with k F < k H , i.e. at low levels of per household capital stock already. As the capital stock increases, its price drops up to the point where it is cheap enough to use it as production factor in the second sector. As capital increases further, male exit the second sector and are replaced by capital. In this reallocation process the ratio κ t is fixed by the marginal rates of transformation and zn t ceases to react to changes in per household capital stock. For high levels of the capital stock only capital is employed in the second sector. The ratio κ t continues to rise in k t , which further attracts women to the labor market. The right panel illustrates the case of large γ where female enter the labor force at a higher threshold k F under l 2,t = 0. At these levels, any increase of k t raises κ t and attracts more women to the labor market. In both panels the dotted line represent the values of κ t when fixing zn t = 1 exogenously. Whenever female labor participation is positive, this dotted line lies below the bold line, representing the equilibrium κ t .
Notice finally that relative price p 2,t /p 1,t depends on k t in a non-monotonic way: for k t < k L the relative price is determined by (21) and increasing in κ t , for k t > k H it is determined by (20) and decreasing in κ t , while finally for k t ∈ [k L , k H ] it is jointly determined by (20) and (21). By the weakly increasing function κ t (k t ) represented in Figure 2 , this implies that for k t < k L the relative price p 2,t /p 1,t is increasing in k t , for k t > k H the relative price is decreasing in k t , and for k t ∈ [k L , k H ] the relative price is constant in k t . Figure 3 illustrates this result. The fundamental reason for this non-monotonicity is that capital intensity of the goods changes over the full range of k t . Due to the high substitutability of factors in X 2 -production, the good X 2 is relatively labor intensive at high rental rates while it is capital intensive at low rental rates. Since further a falling rental rate decreases the price of the capital intensive good by more than the price of the labor intensive good, this generates a U-shaped behavior of prices as a function of the rental rate. Finally, the rental rate is decreasing in the capital stock which leads to the hum-shaped relation of relative prices as a function of per household capital stock represented in Figure 3 .
With the static equilibrium of the closed economy well understood, we turn to the dynamic system next.
Dynamics. The dynamic system is determined by the period-by-period equilibria and the law of motion for capital and labor
Male and female wages are calculated from marginal productivities in the first sector
so that per household saving (8) is
To determine price p 1,t use the normalization of the ideal price index (6) and write
Relative prices depend on whether k 2,t > 0 or l 2,t > 0 and are determined by (20) or (21) accordingly. Again, two regimes are to be distinguished.
The First Regime zn t = 1. In the case of zn t = 1 we combine (31) with (20) or (21) (according to k 2,t > 0 or l 2,t > 0) to write per household saving from (30) as
where we abbreviate ϑ = bθ θ (1 − θ) 1−θ . The dynamics of k t are then determined by (28) together with either (20) and (21), or with (24) or with (23), depending on
Notice that, since the ratio κ t is non-decreasing in k t , the function k t+1 (k t ) is so as well. However, in the range k t ∈ (k L , k H ) the ratio κ t is constant in k t . Consequently, in this range, small increases in today's capital stock do not increase the total savings and leave tomorrow's capital stock unaffected. The function k t+1 (k t ) has a flat part, a plateau. Due to constant returns to both factors in the second sector the increase in capital stock does not affect labor productivity and leaves wages -and thus savings -unchanged.
The Second Regime zn t < 1. With the interior solution of (19) and the relative prices (20) or (21) (according to k 2,t > 0 or l 2,t > 0) per household savings (30) are
The dynamics of k t are then determined by (28) together with either (20) and (21) or with (25) and (26) or with (27) depending on whether
As in the first regime, per household savings are weakly increasing in the capital stock k t since κ t is non-decreasing in k t under zn t > 0 as well and s t is an increasing function of κ t . This implies that, just as in standard Ramsey-type or OLG models, there is no leapfrogging of closed economies and a country that starts out with an initially lower stock of capital does not fully catche up in finite time with another country that is initially endowed with a higher stock of capital.
A Two-Country World Economy
Assume the world economy consists of two countries, Home and Foreign, which engage in free and costless trade in intermediate goods, Neither of the two factors capital and labor is allowed to cross national borders. Both countries have the identical technologies and motives to trade arise only through differences in per household capital stock. The demand structure of intermediate goods is generated by final good production (1) and implies that relative world prices reflect aggregate output. Denoting Foreign's variables with a star, the world prices are then, parallel to (17)
where λ t = L * t /L t is the relative population size of Foreign to Home. To understand the world equilibrium of this two-country economy we start by looking at the two cases where relative factor prices equalize and where they do not. The relevant results are formulated in two Claims. The first claim treats the case where relative factor prices equalize. Proof. Show first that condition (18) implies l 1,t + l * 1,t > 0. To this goal assume l 1,t = l * 1,t = 0. From (32) we have
so that with (18) relative prices fall short of marginal rates of transformation
for at least one country, a contradiction to profit maximization of firms. Hence, without loss of generality we can assume l 1,t > 0. This implies κ t > 0 and
We distinguish three cases.
A. r = r * (33), which implies w . In particular, we have p 2,t b < w M, * t so that l * 1,t = 1 and
This implies κ t = κ * t and hence r = r * a contradiction to the assumption.
C. r > r * , which implies w
. In particular, we have r > p 2,t a and w M t > p 2,t b so that l 2,t = k 2,t = 0. This implies that l * 2,t > 0 or k * 2,t > 0. Notice that l * 1,t > 0 implies (34) and hence the statement of the proposition. Thus, the only case left to consider is l * 2,t = 1. Now notice that l * 2,t = 1 implies k * 2,t = 0. To verify this statement, assume l * 2,t = 1 and k * 2,t > 0, which implies that an atomistic firm in Foreign that hires εκ t units of capital and ε units of male labor to produce in the X 1 -sector makes positive profits
This contradicts the no-arbitrage condition. Consequently, we have l * 2,t = 1 and k * 2,t = 0. This implies
The first of the two conditions implies κ t < κ * t and the second κ t > κ * t . This constitutes a contradiction.
In all three cases we have thus w M t = w M, * t and r t = r * t . Since l 1,t + l * 1,t > 0 and male wage and rental rate of capital are identical, location of production is indeterminate and we can assume wlog that κ t , κ * t > 0. In particular, we have r t = p 1,t (1 − α)aκ , leads to zn t ≤ zn * t .
To determine the conditions for factor price equalization we use the insights of the integrated economy that are summarized in Figure 2 . Further, we denote world aggregates with an upper bar and writē
By Claim 1 we get κ t = κ * t =κ t and zn t = zn * t = zn t in the case of relative factor price equalization. If factors can freely cross borders, the world economy replicates the equilibrium of the integrated economy by definition. However, if factors are confined to remain within national borders, we have to impose additional conditions on the actual factor distribution in order to obtain factor price equalization. These conditions determine the Factor Price Equalization Set (FPES), which is defined as the partition of factors across countries under which the world equilibrium with costless trade in goods replicates the aggregate output pattern of the integrated economy.
In the following the FPES will be computed by separately considering the three cases that were discussed in the closed economy already (k t ≤ k L ,k t ≥ k H , and
. Throughout the computations the aggregate values will be assumed to be constant, e.g. an increase in k * t will be accompanied by a corresponding fall of k t that leavesk t unchanged.
Finally, we assume without loss of generality that the per household stock of capital in Foreign is larger than that in Home, i.e. k t ≤ k * t .
Case 1:k t ≤ k L . In this case we havek 2,t = 0 so that k 2,t = k * 2,t = 0, which implies
This condition determines the labor allocations in the first sector of either country. Now there are two relevant conditions on the factor distribution. These are, first, that in each country the residual amount of male labor (employed in the second sector) be non-negative, i.e. l 1,t ≥ 0, and second, that the capital stock in each country does not fall short of the level needed to provide female workers with the capital ratio of the integrated economy, i.e. k ( * ) t ≥κ t (1 −zn t ). With the identity (36) the first condition can be formulated as k ( * ) t ≤κ t (2 − zn t ). By k t ≤ k * t this inequality is satisfied for k t whenever it holds for k * t while the previous inequality is satisfied for k * t whenever it holds for k t . Hence, the relevant conditions can be summarized asκ
(Withκ t (l 1,t + 1 − zn t ) =k t it is possible to check that the upper bound is larger thank t .)
Case 2:k t ≥ k H . In this case we havel 2,t = 0 so that l 2,t = l * 2,t = 0, which implies
The only condition on the factor distribution is that capital stocks in both countries do not fall short of these levels, i.e. conditions
By k t ≤ k * t this condition is satisfied wheneverκ t (2 − zn t ) ≤ k t holds. With k t = (k t + λk * t )/(1 + λ) this can be written as a condition on Foreign's capital stock
(Withκ t =k 1,t /(2 − zn t ) andk 1,t <k t it is possible to check that the upper bound is larger thank t .)
In this case we havel 2,t > 0 andk 2,t > 0. Now the distribution of two factors (capital and male labor) is to be determined. The conditions to be satisfied are now k 1,t + 1 − zn t ). Combining them with (35),l 1,t = (l 1,t + λl * 1,t )/(1 + λ), andk t =κ t (l 1,t + 1 − zn t ) leads tō
Now notice that the upper bound and the lower bound are increasing l * 1,t . The lower bound is satisfied by setting l * 1,t =l 1,t since by (35) the inequality k t ≤ k * t is equivalent tok t ≤ k * t . The upper bound is maximal at maximal value of l * 1,t . To compute this value, observe that sectoral labor force is bound to be positive, i.e. 
In particular, we have l * 1,t ≤ l * 1,max where l * 1,max = min 1,l 1,t (1 + λ)/λ With these expression, the relevant condition in on the factor distribution becomes
Notice that ask t → k H we havel 1,t → 1 and l * 1,max = 1 so that (39) comprises (38) in the limit. Further, ask t → k L we haveκ t (l 1,t + 1 − zn t ) →k t so that (39) comprises (37) in the limit.
Given the aggregate state variablek t and the resulting equilibrium of the integrated economy (characterized byl 1,t ,κ t , and zn t ) the inequalities (37), (38), and (39) reflect the conditions under which factor prices equalize in the three different regimes. Using the graphical representation of the factor price equalization set from Helpman and Krugman (1985) , Figure 4 illustrates the FPES as the grey area within the box of all possible factor endowments. Each point in the box represents a unique distribution of factors (male) labor and capital: Home's factor endowments are represented by the distance of such a point to axis, Foreign's simply are the residuals. The constraints (37), (38), and (39) delimit the borders of the FPES.
The top panel depicts the casek t < k L (condition (37) applies) where only labor is used in X 2 -production. This means that a country without any capital can trade with a relatively capital abundant country and the efficient use of factors of the integrated economy is still granted. Necessary condition, however, is that the capital-less country is not too big, i.e. its male labor force does not exceed the male labor allocation to the second sector in the integrated economy.
The middle panel illustrates the casek t ∈ (k L , k H ) (condition (38) applies), where both factors -capital and labor -are employed in X 2 -production in the integrated economy. Accordingly, moderately sized countries either without any capital endowment or else with a negligible labor force can be part of the efficient two-country world economy that replicates the integrated economy.
The bottom panelk t > k H (condition (39) applies), where only capital is used in X 2 -production in the integrated economy. In this case, a country with a negligible labor force can be part of the efficient world economy. A country without any capital, however, cannot.
If the conditions for factor price equalization are satisfied and Claim 1 applies we can draw some conclusions concerning labor income of the economy. To this aim recall that we assume k t ≤ k * t , which implies the inequalitites k t ≤k t ≤ k * t . Now, Claim 
1 shows that within the factor price equalization set, the ratio of capital to mental labor in the first sector equalizes in both countries and must therefore coincide with the one of the integrated economy κ t = κ * t =κ t . Since κ is non-decreasing in the per household capital stock this implies that trade reduces κ in the capital rich country (Foreign) relative to autarky while trade increases κ t in the capital scarce country (Home). Denoting autarky variables with the superscript A we can write
Further, since wages (12) - (14) and female labor force participation (19) are nondecreasing in κ this implies that trade weakly increases total labor income in the capital scarce country relative to autarky while it weakly reduces it in the capital rich country. By (8) labor income equals total savings, which means that the following period's per household capital stock and consequentially trade increases (reduces) total savings in capital scarce (rich) countries.
Finally, as male and female wages as well as female labor force participation is identical in both countries labor earning and thus savings per household are identical by (8). This implies that, following a period of factor price equalization, per household capital stocks are identical in the two countries for all consecutive period. Thus, all per household variables of in the two economies trivially coincide in all times following a period factor price equalization.
Both observations together imply that, conditional on factor price equalization in the first period, trade increases (reduces) per household capital stock persistently in the capital scarce (rich) country.
The above reflections show that in the present model where the motives of international specialization come from differences in factor endowments all economic action that stems from international trade is shut down after a period of factor price equalization. This observation directs our interest to the periods where factor prices do not equalize. The second claim treats this case.
Claim 2 Assume that w
holds in the world equilibrium with free trade. Then
, and w (vii) zn t > zn * t .
(viii) k t < k (iv) If l 1,t > 0 the statement follows from (ii). If l 1,t = 0 it follows from (iii).
Claim 1 implies that, unless the closed economy, a country with an initially lower per household capital stock, can catch up with a capital rich country in finite time under international trade. At the same time Claim 2 (ix) means that, just as in the closed economy, there is no true leapfrogging, i.e. a country that is capital scare initially does not enjoy a higher capital stock than a country that is initially relatively capital abundant.
In the following we will compare the key variables from the autarky and the trade equilibrium. To this aim we denote all variables from the autarky equilibrium with a superscript A (e.g. κ A t ), all others are variables of the free trade equilibrium (e.g. κ t ).
Definition For k t < k L define g(k t ) as the capital stock g(k t ) > k t for which prices equalize in two closed economies one endowed with k t , the other with g(k t ), i.e. g is implicitly defined by p
With Figure 3 , the definition ofk implies that the pair (k t , g(k t )) lies on a horizontal line that crosses the price schedule twice in the corresponding price levels.
With these notations we can formulate the following Claim.
Claim 3 For capital scarce countries exporting the mental-labor-intensive good (X 1 ), trade decreases the ratio κ t while for capital abundant countries exporting the mentallabor-intensive good (X 1 ), trade increases the ratio κ t . More precisely, we state
where k M is defined by
and κ M solves (20)- (21).
Proof. See appendix.
A quick look at Figure 3 , which represents relative prices as a function of the capital stock shoes that autarky prices p A 2,t /p A 1,t in Home are higher than in Foreign in the cases (ii), (iii), (iv), and (vi) so that Home imports X 2 and exports X 1 in these cases. If its capital stock k t falls short of the threshold k M , this means that trade weakly reduces its capital-mental labor ratio in the first sector (κ t ). In, instead, its capital stock k t exceeds the threshold k M trade increases it. In cases (i) and (v) autarky prices p A 2,t /p A 1,t in Home are lower than in Foreign, Home imports X 1 and exports X 2 and the effect of trade on κ t is reversed.
The intuition of the finding in Claim 3 is the following. A capital poor country produces X 2 using primarily the factor physical (male) labor. Now suppose the X 2 -sector in this country contracts because it engages in trade and imports X 2 . This means that male workers are driven out of the X 2 -sector and into the X 1 -sector, thus reducing the capital labor share κ t in the first sector. If instead the X 2 -sector expands because the country exports X 2 , male workers leave the first sector and the ratio κ t increases.
A contrary effect happens in a capital scarce country that produces X 2 using primarily capital. If such a country imports X 2 , its X 2 -sector contracts and capital is reallocated from the second to the first sector, increasing κ t . If the country exports X 2 instead, its X 2 -sector expands and capital is shifted from the first to the second sector, decreasing the ratio κ t .
Notice that the additional effect of changing female labor participation does not alter this picture. This is because female labor force participation reacts to the gender wage gap and thus to changes in κ t and, being subject to this determinant cannot overturn the original effect.
Claim 3 establishes statements concerning the effect of trade on the ratio κ t in different constellations of trade partners. Under some parameter restrictions these translate directly into statements on female labor force participation (FLFP). The relevant conditions are, first, that advantages for male labor is not too small
and second, that the weight on children exceeds a minimum
Under these assumptions we can formulate the following Proposition 1 Assume (43) and (44) hold. Then, if k t < k M and Home exports the mental-labor-intensive good X 1 , trade decreases FLFP, (1 − zn t ). Conversely, if k t > k M and Home exports the mental-labor-intensive good (X 1 ), trade increases FLFP. In particular,
where k M is defined by (42).
Proof. See appendix.
For the cases (i) and (iv) -(vi) Proposition 1 has direct implications on wages and, by consequence, on capital accumulation of Home's and Foreign's economies. In particular, under the conditions of (i), (vi), and (v) trade increases male and female wages in Home, decreases Home's the gender gap and per household savings -i.e. capital accumulation -rises. Conversely, under the conditions (iv) trade decreases wages, widens the gender gap and depresses per household capital accumulation.
14 To see this, use (8) and (9), which lead to
In case (i) applies Home exports X 2 and p A 2,t ≤ p 2,t so that (w In case (iv) or (vi) applies, Home exports X 1 and p A 1,t ≤ p 1,t . As l 1,t , l A 1,t > 0 and, by Claim 3, κ A t ≤ κ t this means that male and female wages increase and the gender gap closes. Again, by (45) trade increases capital accumulation.
In case (v) applies, k * t < k t holds so that by Claim 2 (iv) l 1,t > 0. 
Concluding Remarks
This paper reveals the impact of trade on household's tradeoff between fertility and female labor force participation. Moreover, our theory suggests that international trade has affected the evolution of economies asymmetrically. Initial differences in capital labor ratios across countries and factor intensity across sectors determine specialization patterns which can further intensify asymmetries of capital labor ratios. A novel feature of our model is that due to differences in factors substitution across sectors capital intensity switches as economies develop. This feature produces a non-monotonic relation between the specialization pattern and the stock of capital of the trade partner.
As a result of international specialization some countries will specialize in production of goods which is particularly suitable for female workers. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of the expansion of this "female sector" on female labor force participation is ambiguous. The reason is that, by general equilibrium forces, trade makes the importing sector contract and factors reallocate to the exporting sector. If capital is the main factor reallocated to the "female sector", female wages increase and female labor participation rises. If, however, primarily male workers enter the "female sector", this leads to a depression of wages and the exit female labor. Which of both effects prevails is determinant of the capital endowment of the country in question. 
Proof of (i). Note that assumption k t < k L implies k A 1,t = k t and l A 2,t > 0. By (20) and (21) (see also Figure 3 ) condition k * t ∈ (k t , g(k t )) implies that inequality (46) holds and (47) applies. In case that factor prices equalize we have k t <k t < k * t so that κ A t ≤κ t = κ t follows.
In case that factor prices do not equalize Claim 2 (i) applies and k 2,t = 0. As Home exports X 2 this implies l 2,t > 0 so that If instead l 1,t = 0 we have (again by Claim 2 (i)) k 1,t = k t so that
This proves (i).
Proof of (ii). As in (i) assumption k t < k L implies k A 1,t = k t and l A 2,t > 0. Condition k * t ∈ (k t , g(k t )) implies p and (48) applies. As Home exports X 1 we have l 1,t > 0 by condition (18) and we distinguish the two cases l 1,t < 1 and l 1,t = 1.
If l 1,t < 1 we have l 2,t > 0 and If l 1,t = 1 we have l 2,t = 0 and
which proves (ii). 
Proof of (iii
Fourth, l 2,t = k 2,t = 0, which leads to
where the second inequality follows from (42) and
Proof of (iv). Fourth, l 2,t = k 2,t = 0, which leads to
Proof of (v). Note that k * t ∈ (g −1 (k t ), k t ) implies k * t < k t and p A 2,t /p A 1,t < p * ,A 2,t /p * ,A 1,t so that (47) applies.
In case that factor prices equalize we have k * t <k t < k t so that κ t =κ t ≤ κ A t . Thus consider the where case factor prices do not equalize. Since Foreign exports X 1 we have l * 1,t > 0 by (18) so that, with Claim 2 (ii) we conclude l 1,t = 1 (by k * t < k t Home and Foreign switch roles in Claim 2). As Home exports X 2 this implies k 2,t > 0 and hence with (47) r Proof of (vi). Note that k * t ∈ (g −1 (k t ), k t ) implies p 
